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In this article I show that both aspects of financial development, namely, 
liberalisation and deepening, and fi nancial internationalisation proxied using cross- 
listings in the US creates value for emerging market fi rms. Financial deepening, 
or more precisely, stock market deepening enhances value. In contrast, bank sector 
deepening only serves to reduce value because it is associated with large-scale 
corporate expansion and a fall in market capitalisation. Like others, I document 
a cross-listing premium for Level 2/3 cross-listings in the US. The cross-listing 
premium is typically less than the gains from fi nancial liberalisation, but they are 
similar in magnitude over the period examined. 
JEL Classifi cation: G15, F36 
Keywords: Financial liberalisation, fi nancial deepening, internationalisa-
tion, Tobin’s q
1. Introduction
Since the seminal work of Fazzari et al. (1988), much work has sought to 
explain why fi rms are fi nancially constrained. Firms are deemed fi nancially 
constrained if a windfall increase in the supply of internals funds leads to 
higher investment outlay. Recent work suggests that the types of fi rm that are 
most constrained tend to be small, non-listed, non-group nor foreign owned, 
national (as opposed to multinational) and government owned (Beck et al. 
2006), and the sources of these constraints tend to be fi nancial (e.g., high 
interest rates, poor access to long-term loans, little or no access to foreign 
banks), legal (e.g., ineffi cient legal system, poor enforcement of contracts) 
and institutional based (e.g., corruption, regulatory quality, political stability) 
(Beck et al. 2005; Beck et al. 2006; Beck and Demirguc-Kunt 2006). 
Furthermore, since fi nancial, legal and institutional development tends to 
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be more advanced in developed as opposed to emerging countries, fi nancing 
constraints tend to be more severe in the latter (Beck et al. 2006; Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic 1998). The general conclusions from this line of work 
suggest that both fi rm- and country-level factors explain fi rm-level fi nancing 
constraints that they tend to complement one another (e.g., on average a small 
fi rm is even more constrained where the banking sector is poorly developed), 
and of the country-level factors, institutional development, or more precisely 
the lack of, tends to have the greatest impact on retarding fi rm-level growth. 
Of course, this then suggests that country-level attempts to foster fi nancial, 
legal and institutional development are likely to lower fi rm-level fi nancing 
constraints, increase investment and promote growth.
Given the perceived benefi ts that arise from fi nancial development, it is 
perhaps not surprising that countries have initiated a number of fi nancial 
sector reforms in an attempt to realize these gains. Collectively, these reforms 
are often referred to as fi nancial liberalisation. These policies include the 
strengthening of fi nancial sector supervision and regulation, privatisation 
of the domestic banking sector, where foreign banks were now permitted 
to participate, stock market liberalisations and concurrent reforms, and the 
reduction in barriers, which prevented the fl ow of capital internationally. 
While the introduction of these reforms does not come about without 
some short-term costs (e.g., higher incidence of banking crises; Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache 1999), and greater output volatility (Kaminsky and 
Schmukler 2008), recent work suggests that such liberalisation policies are 
associated with long-term net benefi ts at the overall macro economy level 
(Kaminsky and Schmukler 2008; Levine 2001).1 In turn, these policies 
have tended to succeed in exactly what they set out to do, i.e., deepen 
fi nancial markets (equity and banking/credit markets),2 although as shown 
by Tressel and Detragaiche (2008), fi nancial liberalisation only serves to 
1 A large literature has tried to explain such boom-bust behaviour in the aftermath of fi nancial 
liberalisation reforms. For example, Allen and Gale (1999, 2000) and Schneider and Tornell 
(2004) show that fi nancial liberalisation leads to riskier behaviour by banks.
2 A large literature exists which examines whether stock and bank-sector development con-
tributes to the growth of the real economy (Beck and Levine 2004; Levine 1991, 1998; Levine 
and Zervos 1998). The recent work, which is robust to many of the econometric issues that 
plagued earlier studies, suggests that both stock markets and banks positively infl uence growth. A 
related line of work shows that the development of stock markets need not necessarily adversely 
affect the banking sector (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 1996).
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promote fi nancial deepening where institutions are suffi ciently developed 
to curb political power, which is consistent with the line of reasoning pre-
sented earlier.3 Together, both aspects of fi nancial development, namely, 
liberalisation and deepening have served to provide sizable benefi ts at the 
fi rm level, although they have tended to benefi t smaller fi rms more (Beck 
et al. 2008; Christoffersen et al. 2006), since fi nancial liberalisation results 
in a fairer allocation of capital between small and large fi rms (Abiad et al. 
2004).4 Collectively, fi nancial development has resulted in greater access to 
external fi nancing, resulting in a relaxation of fi nancing constraints, improved 
operating performance, which ultimately has led to greater externally fi nanced 
growth for these fi rms (Khurana et al. 2006; Laeven 2003; Love 2003; Mitton 
2006; Rajan and Zingales 1998 for studies which examine the impact of 
fi nancial liberalisation/deepening/development on fi rms).
In addition to the reform measures enacted at the country level, at the fi rm 
level, fi rms have augmented these country-level reforms with liberalisation 
events, collectively known as ‘internationalisations’, in order to further reduce 
their fi nancing constraints and further their growth. Much of this ‘inter-
nationalisation’ activity that has come after domestic fi nancial development is 
well advanced, and has generally taken the form of international cross-listings, 
especially in the US, and international capital raising activity.5 For example, 
3 Entirely consistent with this line of reasoning, others have shown that in some countries, 
liberalisations have provided limited stock market development, and in some instances, have 
actually led to a deterioration in market performance (de la Torre and Schmukler 2006). Also, 
a large literature shows that other factors also matter for stock market development (Billmeier 
and Massa 2009; Boyd et al. 2001; De la Torre et al. 2007;  La Porta et al. 1997, 1998; Li 2007). 
For example, Rajan and Zingales (2003) and Claessens et al. (2006) show that more developed 
countries tend to have deeper stock markets.
4 Financial liberalisation generally refers to reform which result in a lower degree of govern-
ment involvement, which ultimately leads to a more market-based fi nancial system. Alternatively, 
fi nancial deepening refers to increases in volumes of markets, e.g., liquidity, market capitalisations, 
lending in the case of banking/credit markets.
5 Claessens et al. (2006) and De la Torre et al. (2007) show that stock market development 
also promotes internationalisation, which has the potential to offset some of the gains from 
earlier liberalisation reforms. In a similar vein, Levine and Schmukler (2007) show that inter-
nationalisation is negatively related to the trading activity of domestic fi rms that refrain from 
becoming ‘international’ fi rms, and in a related paper, show that the domestic trading of fi rms 
that cross-list ‘migrates’ to international exchanges, once these fi rms internationalise. See also 
Moel (2001) and Karolyi (2004) who examine the relationship between American Depositary 
Receipt issuance and stock market development in emerging markets.
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between 1990 and its peak in 2000, the number of exchange, i.e., Level 
2/3 ADRs increased from 176 to 608, while the number of non-exchange 
listings, i.e., Level 1 and Rule 144a lists, is even greater. In addition, Gozzi 
et al. (2010) show that international capital raisings has increased fourfold 
since 1991, resulting in about 30 per cent of all capital raised by fi rms being 
raised internationally. Subsequent work has shown that such actions by fi rms 
have by and large been successful. For example, ‘internationalisation’ has 
lowered fi rms’ cost of capital, reduced their fi nancing constraints, ultimately 
facilitating corporate growth and expansion, both at home and abroad 
(Khurana et al. 2008; Lins et al. 2005; Reese and Weisbach 2002).
A concurrent line of research has focused on how these programmes, given 
their positive impact on operating performance and growth, ultimately impact 
on fi rm value. A priori, since the earlier mentioned benefi ts from liberalisation 
and internationalisation reforms are likely to infl uence fi rm size and stock 
prices, it is not altogether obvious how such reforms impact on fi rm value. 
A large and still growing literature has examined whether cross-listing in the 
US, and elsewhere, manifests into a cross-listing premium for cross-listing 
fi rms. The evidence is mixed. While there appears to be consensus agreement 
that a cross-listing premium exists, although perhaps not for cross-listings in 
the UK (Doidge et al. [2009] fi nd that there is not, Bianconi and Tan [2010] 
conclude otherwise), there is general disagreement about the durability of 
this premium. Doidge et al. (2009) suggest that it is permanent, while others 
suggest that it is transitory (Gozzi et al. 2008; Sarkissian and Schill 2009, 
2010).6 In a similar vein, Mitton and O’Connor (2010) fi nd that invest-
ability (i.e., a fi rm-level measure of stock market liberalisations, and thus 
one aspect of fi nancial liberalisation) also increases fi rm value. Thus, while 
it is generally well accepted that ‘internationalisations’ and some aspects of 
fi nancial liberalisation impact positively on fi rm value, very little is known 
about how fi nancial liberalisation as a whole, and other components of 
liberalisation, impact fi rm value.7 Furthermore, no study has ever examined, 
to the best of my knowledge, how fi nancial deepening, as opposed to 
liberalisation, impacts on fi rm value. Finally, since the valuation gains from 
fi nancial development, i.e., fi nancial liberalisation and deepening have not 
6 For a review of the legal bonding hypothesis, see Benos and Weisbach (2004), Ferris et al. 
(2009) and Karolyi (2006, 2010).
7 Others disagree. They suggest that an international listing, e.g., in the US, does not have 
permanent positive valuation gains for fi rms (Gozzi et al. 2008; Sarkissian and Schill 2009, 
2010).
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yet been fully investigated, we know little or nothing about how the gains 
from fi nancial development and internationalisations compare to one another. 
Here, in this article I attempt to fi ll this void.
To do so, I examine how fi nancial liberalisation, fi nancial deepening and 
internationalisations impact on the value of 2,899 emerging market fi rms 
over the period from 1982 to 2002. I follow others (Doidge et al. 2004, 
2009; Gozzi et al. 2008; Mitton and O’Connor 2010) and measure fi rm 
value using Tobin’s q. I measure fi nancial liberalisation using the recently 
updated index created by Abiad et al. (2008). I prefer to use this index over 
others (Kaminsky and Schmukler 2008; Laeven 2003) since this index allows 
for reversals in fi nancial liberalisation.8 Similar to others (Schmukler and 
Vesperoni 2006), I measure fi nancial deepening as the sum of stock and bank 
sector deepening. In turn, stock market deepening is measured as stock market 
capitalisation to GDP, and bank sector deepening is measured as liabilities 
of the banking sector, as a percentage of GDP, respectively. Finally, I defi ne 
internationalisations using fi rms that cross-list in the US.
Using a series of fi rm fi xed effects regressions, I show that fi nancial devel-
opment impacts on fi rm value, via both fi nancial liberalisation and fi nancial 
deepening. However, the valuation gains from fi nancial deepening are much 
larger, and arise solely from equity/stock market deepening. In contrast, bank 
sector deepening reduces fi rm value, mainly because it is associated with 
large-scale corporate expansion. Similar to others, I document a cross-listing 
premium for Level 2/3 lists in the US. This premium tends to be of the same 
magnitude as the gains from fi nancial liberalisation over the sample period, 
although large-scale fi nancial liberalisation programmes typically imply larger 
increases in fi rm value. Finally, on further inspection of the components of 
Tobin’s q, I fi nd that the valuation gains from fi nancial liberalisation arise from 
a reduction in fi rm size, and a concurrent increase in market capitalisation. 
Since I am using the Worldscope database, which is generally made up of the 
largest fi rms in each country, the former is consistent with the notion that 
8 Laeven’s (2003) fi nancial liberalisation index covers six reform measures, namely, interest 
rate deregulation, reduction of entry barriers, reduction of reserve requirements, reduction 
of credit controls, privatisation of state banks and strengthening of regulation. The index is 
increasing in fi nancial liberalisation and ranges from 0 to 6. The major fl aw with this index is 
that it does not account for reversals in fi nancial liberalisation. The Kaminsky and Schmukler 
(2008) Index ranges from 0 to 3, is decreasing in fi nancial liberalisation, and covers capital 
account, domestic fi nancial sector reform and stock market reforms. Similar to Abiad et al. 
(2008), the index allows for reversals in the liberalisation process.
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fi nancial development disproportionately benefi ts small fi rms, thus promot-
ing their growth and slowing the growth of large fi rms (i.e., liberalisation 
lowers fi rm size and deepening increases fi rm size, but growth ultimately 
slows; Costantini 2008).
This article makes a number of different contributions. First, I extend 
the literature which examines how fi nancial sector reforms and internation-
alisations impact the fi rm value. I extend Mitton and O’Connor’s fi ndings 
(2010), and show that other aspects of fi nancial liberalisation and fi nancial 
development as a whole impact on fi rm value. Second, this article also 
contributes to the literature, which compares the liberalisation and deepening 
processes. Abiad et al. (2004) demonstrate how fi nancial liberalisation, and 
not deepening, serves to improve the allocation of capital between small 
and large fi rms. I show that both matter, but fi nancial deepening matters 
the most. Third, this article also analyses how domestic market reforms and 
fi nancial internationalisation (at the fi rm level) compare in their effects on 
fi rm value. Along these lines, Schmukler and Vesperoni (2006) fi nd that 
domestic fi nancial reforms and fi nancial globalisation (measured using access 
international debt and equity markets, e.g., ADRs) have very different effects 
on the maturity structure of corporate debt. Flavin and O’Connor (2010) 
show that liberalisation reforms, i.e., stock market liberalisations and cross-
listings impact similarly on corporate capital structure, but fi rms that were 
previously investable (through stock market liberalisations) behave differently 
once they cross-list to cross-listing fi rms that were previously not investable. 
I fi nd that the gains from cross-listing on a US exchange are similar in 
magnitude to the gains arising from fi nancial liberalisation over the sample 
period, although fi nancial liberalisation typically implies larger increases in 
fi rm value. Finally, these results suggest that fi rms would gain more, at least 
in terms of value, not from cross-listing abroad, but from policy issues that 
promote fi nancial deepening at home.
The article proceeds as follows. Next, I describe the data. Section 3 pre-
sents the regression specifi cations and a discussion of the results. Section 4 
concludes.
2. Data Description
I begin this study by sourcing a full list of emerging market fi rms from the 
country lists of the Worldscope database. To ensure that my article is dir-
ectly comparable to Mitton and O’Connor (2010), I use the same sample 
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of countries that they employ. Using this sample of fi rms, I drop fi rms with 
missing data, fi rms with two or less observations and fi nancial fi rms, since 
these fi rms are likely to be valued differently to non-fi nancial fi rms. Exclud-
ing fi nancial/banking fi rms from my sample is of little concern to me, since 
I am interested in how, amongst others, banking-sector reforms impact on 
the value of non-fi nancial fi rms. After imposing these data requirements, 
my fi nal sample is made up of 2,899 fi rms from 20 emerging market coun-
tries. They are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Greece, India, 
Indonesia, Israel, Korea (Republic), Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand and Turkey. While my 
sample undoubtedly contains countries that are no longer seen as emerging 
(e.g., Portugal), they are included in my fi nal sample since they were in 
part of the sample period deemed emerging. The fi nal sample is outlined 
in Table 1.
In Table 1, I outline by country, the fi rst year in which fi rms enter the 
database, the number of fi rms (No. of Obs) and the number of fi rm-year 
observations. Since Worldscope coverage of emerging market fi rms is sparse 
in the 1980s, much of the fi rms in my fi nal sample do not enter until the 
middle part of the sample period. For example, fi rms (which pass the data 
requirements) from Argentina, Brazil, Philippines, Taiwan and Turkey do 
not enter the sample until 1990, while fi rms from amongst others, Chile 
(1992), China (1992), and Pakistan (1994), enter later. The early part of the 
sample period is entirely comprised of fi rms from Korea, Malaysia, Mexico 
and South Africa. Firms from these countries enter the sample in 1982. 
The number of sample fi rms per country varies from a high of 547 (2,553 
fi rm-year observations) from Korea, to a low of just 10 fi rms for Colombia 
(81 fi rm-year observations). Malaysia (307 fi rms), Taiwan (256 fi rms), India 
(227) and South Africa (215) collectively supply 1,005 fi rms (6,188 fi rm-year 
observations) to the fi nal sample of fi rms.
To measure fi nancial liberalisation, I use the fi nancial liberalisation 
index constructed by Abiad et al. (2008). This index tracks several dimen-
sions of fi nancial sector reforms in 60 countries from 1973 to 2002. These 
are (i) credit controls and reserve requirements; (ii) interest rate controls; 
(iii) bank entry barriers; (iv) bank privatisation; (v) bank supervision; 
(vi) security market reforms and (vii) international capital fl ows. Along each 
of the seven dimensions, a country is given a score on a graded scale from 
0 to 3. Zero refers to the highest degree of repression and three refers to 
fully liberalised. Consequently, a higher score indicates a higher degree of 
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fi nancial liberalisation. The authors identifi ed the various policy changes by 
consulting a number of different sources. These included surveys of fi nancial 
liberalisation, central bank bulletins and websites, IMF country reports, books 
and other journal articles. The combined index ranges from a low of 0 to a 
high of 18 if the country is fully liberalised. In Figure 1, I outline the median 
value and trend of the fi nancial liberalisation index from 1982 to 2002. The 
trend is calculated as the coeffi cient estimates on the year dummies (relative to 
1982) from estimating the following regression: FLct = α + Countryc + Yeart + εit, where FL is the fi nancial liberalisation index, Country and Year are 
country and year fi xed effects, respectively. I include the trend variable since 
fi nancial liberalisation data coverage differs across countries, and thus changes 
in median value are likely to be, in part, infl uenced by changes in sample 
composition (from countries entering the sample at different times). The 
median and trend data show how emerging fi nancial markets have become 
more liberalised over time. For each country, I report the range of the fi nancial 
liberalisation index, which I defi ne as the range of values that the index 
Figure 1
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Financial 
Liberalisation
Financial 
Deepening
Equity 
Deepening
Bank 
Deepening
Mean 13.15 1.28 0.68 0.61
Median 14.00 1.10 0.41 0.50
Standard deviation 3.14 0.78 0.57 0.29
Source: Financial deepening data is sourced from an updated version of Beck et al. (2000).
Notes: This fi gure displays the median and trend (within-country) for measures of fi nancial 
liberalisation, fi nancial deepening, equity (stock), and bank sector deepening from 1982 
to 2002. The index of fi nancial liberalisation ranges from 0 to 18 (fully liberalised) 
and is taken from Abiad et al. (2008). Financial deepening is the sum of stock and 
bank sector deepening. Equity/stock market deepening is measured as stock market 
capitalisation to GDP, and bank sector deepening is measured as liabilities of the 
banking sector, also as a percentage of GDP. 
takes from the time in which fi rms from each country fi rst enter the sample 
(see Column 2) to the end of the sample period (2002). Since reversals are 
possible in the Abiad et al. (2008) index, the range does not necessarily corres-
pond to the difference between the minimum and maximum values. Over 
the sample period, Chile, Israel, Mexico and Peru became fully liberalised 
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(all have a maximum value of 18), China remained the least liberalised 
(8.25), and Mexico experienced the greatest improvement in fi nancial sector 
reforms.
To measure fi nancial deepening, I follow Schmukler and Vesperoni (2006), 
and use the sum of stock and bank sector deepening. Stock market deepening 
is measured as stock market capitalisation to GDP, and bank sector deepening 
is measured as liabilities of the banking sector, also as a percentage of GDP. 
This data is sourced from an updated version of the fi nancial development 
database provided by Beck et al. (2000). In the last three columns of 
Table 1, I outline the median value (measured over time) of each of the fi nan-
cial deepening measures by country. Bank sector deepening data is unavailable 
for both China and Taiwan. Equity markets tend to be larger in Malaysia, 
South Africa and Taiwan, and in the case of Malaysia and South Africa, as a 
percentage of GDP, equity markets tend to be larger than the banking sector. 
In contrast, as a percentage of GDP, the banking sector is, relative to the equity 
market, larger in Israel, Pakistan, Portugal and Thailand. On an absolute basis, 
the banking sector is more highly developed in Malaysia, Thailand, Portugal 
and Israel. Over the sample period, Malaysia witnessed the greatest equity 
and bank sector deepening (unreported). In contrast, Pakistan experienced 
the least. Figure 1 displays the median and trend of each of these fi nancial 
deepening variables over time. These suggest that the banking sector and 
equity markets have become highly developed over time.
Finally, I use US cross-listings to proxy for fi rm-level globalisation/inter-
nationalisation. Gozzi et al. (2008) classify fi rms as international fi rms if they 
are either cross-listed in the US, or raise capital internationally. Schmukler 
and Vesperoni (2006) do likewise. I do not have access to international 
capital-raising data, and as such, I only use US cross-listing ADRs to classify 
fi rms as international. There are four different types of ADRs, namely, 
Level 1, Level, 2, Level 3, and Rule 144a. Levels 2 and 3 are traded on the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the National Association of Securities 
Dealers Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ), and the American Stock 
Exchange (AMEX). Most foreign fi rms that use ADRs typically do so on 
either the NYSE or Nasdaq. The vast majority of foreign fi rms on the AMEX 
are ordinary Canadian lists. Level 1 fi rms trade over-the-counter (OTC), and 
Rule 144a ADRs are privately placed to Qualifi ed Institutional Buyers (QIB) 
on Portal. The disclosure and regulatory requirements of international fi rms 
that list in the US differ across the different listing choices. Firms that list as 
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ordinary shares, e.g., mainly Canadian and Israel fi rms, or as Level 2/3 ADRs 
on US exchanges, i.e., NYSE, AMEX, Nasdaq, are mandated to provide 
greater disclosures and reconcile their accounting procedures to US GAAP. 
These fi rms are subject to both the oversight of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, and the same Securities Laws that bound native US fi rms, e.g., 
they are subject to civil liability under Section 18 of the 1934 Securities & 
Exchange Act. These fi rms are also subject to the listing requirements and 
governance obligations of the individual exchanges, although these can be 
waived in certain instances. Finally, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 requires 
that CEO’s and CFO’s must personally certify that information in each year 
fi led under form 20-F is accurate and free from material misstatements and 
omissions, and that the fi nancial statements and other fi nancial information 
in the report fairly present, in all material respects, the issuer’s fi nancial 
position, results of operations and cash fl ows. In contrast, fi rms that trade in 
the US as Level 1 and/or Rule 144a lists are subject to minimal listing and 
regulatory requirements. Both are exempt from reconciling their accounts 
to US GAAP, and are minimally affected by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. They 
require minimal SEC registration and are exempt from the SEC’s reporting 
and accounting obligations under Rule 12g3-2(b). They provide instead, 
an English translation of fi nancial statements prepared according to home 
country accounting practices.
All information on cross-listed fi rms is sourced from the Bank of New 
York, and cross-referenced with information from Deutsche Bank, JP Morgan, 
the New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq. I classify fi rms according to their 
initial cross-listing in the US and ignore all subsequent listings changes, 
e.g., upgrades from Level 1 over-the-counter to Level 2/3 exchange traded 
depositary receipts. I take great care to identify a fi rm’s initial listing. To do 
so, I consult the historical records from the Bank of New York (since the 
currently available online records refer to a fi rms current [and not previous/
initial] cross-listing). I cross-reference this data with the cross-listing database 
provided by Citibank. Specifi cally, they fl ag fi rms that have changed their 
cross-listing status by including a ‘successor depositary receipt’ data type for 
all fi rms. Using both databases, fi rms are classifi ed as either a Level 1 over-
the-counter, Level 2/3 exchange-traded, or a Rule 144a listing that trade on 
Portal to Qualifi ed Institutional Buyers.
I employ Tobin’s q to measure fi rm value, where Tobin’s q is defi ned as the 
book debt plus market capitalisation divided by the book assets. Similar to 
Gozzi et al. (2008), I ultimately deviate away from the original defi nition of 
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Tobin’s q by proxying for market debt by using its book value counterpart, 
and measure the replacement cost of assets as book assets. Book debt is 
calculated as book total assets less book equity. Doidge et al. (2004, 2009), 
Gozzi et al. (2008), and Mitton and O’Connor (2010) also use Tobin’s q to 
proxy for fi rm value in their studies on the valuation effects of international 
cross-listings, internationalisation and investability, respectively. All fi rm-
level fi nancial information is sourced from Worldscope for each year from 
1982 to 2002. In the fi fth column of Table 1, I outline the median Tobin’s 
q by country. These fi gures are generally in line with Chua et al. (2006): the 
median Taiwanese (Tobin’s q of 1.20) and Chinese (Tobin’s q of 1.40) fi rms 
tend to be worth more than other emerging market fi rms.9 
I control for fi rm- and industry-related factors commonly employed in 
other studies using Tobin’s q. I use the average (geometric) sales growth 
(infl ation-adjusted) over the last two years and global industry q to account 
for fi rm and industry growth, respectively. On the basis of the Worldscope 
General Industry Classifi cations, the (yearly) mean global industry q is cal-
culated as the average q of all global fi rms within each classifi cation. I use the 
log of sales (infl ation-adjusted and in US$), rather than total assets (given 
the defi nition of Tobin’s q) to control for fi rm size.
3. Methodology and Results
To examine the relationship between fi nancial liberalisation, deepening, 
internationalisation and fi rm value, I estimate within-fi rm regressions of 
the following form:
 qi,t = α + β1Xi,t + γ1FinLibc,t + γ2FinDeepc,t + γ3L1i,t  + γ4L2/3i,t + γ5Rulel44ai,t + Yeart + Firmi + ei,t, (1)
where q is Tobin’s q, Xit is a set of fi rm-level controls (i.e., fi rm growth, fi rm 
size, and global industry q); FinLib is fi nancial liberalisation, L1, L2/3, and 
Rule 144a are dummy variable that equals 1 if fi rm i cross-lists in the US 
either as a Level 1, Level 2/3, or Rule 144a ADR in year t and zero otherwise, 
FinDeep is fi nancial deepening, Yeart represents a full set of year dummy 
9 Interestingly since 1993, the value of emerging market fi rms has tended to fall. By the 
end of 2002, emerging market fi rms were worth considerably less than they were at the start 
of the sample period (i.e., a within-fi rm trend fall of 0.30 between 1982 and 2002), which is 
economically large since the average fi rm has a Tobin’s q of 1.32.
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variables and Firmi is a full-set of fi rm fi xed effects. The coeffi cient esti-
mates that results from estimating variants of Equation (1) are presented in 
Table 2, with heteroscedastic-consistent t-statistics à la White (1980) pre-
sented underneath in brackets.10
In Column 1, I regress Tobin’s q on the fi nancial liberalisation index 
alone. In the next three columns, I sequentially add fi rm-level control vari-
ables in turn. Column 5 contains the coeffi cient estimates, which result 
from including fi nancial liberalisation and internationalisation (i.e., equity 
cross-listings) simultaneously. In Column 6, I maintain the cross-listing 
variables, but replace the fi nancial liberalisation index with the fi nancial 
deepening measure. In Column 7, I include all three measures simultane-
ously. In Columns 8 and 9, I include both components of fi nancial deepening 
individually, along with the fi nancial liberalisation and internationalisation 
dummies. Finally, in Column 10, both equity and bank sector deepening, 
along with fi nancial liberalisation and the cross-listing dummies are included 
simultaneously.
The coeffi cient estimates suggest the following: First, in Columns 1 to 4, 
the fi nancial liberalisation index is positive and statistically different from 
0. The coeffi cient estimates range from 0.016 to 0.024, which suggests that 
fi nancial liberalisation has a positive impact on fi rm value. Furthermore, in all 
specifi cations, the fi rm-level controls are statistically signifi cant, and are of the 
correct sign: fi rm value increases in fi rm and industry-level growth and larger 
fi rms tend to be worth less. These results are consistent with the fi ndings of 
Laeven (2003) and Love (2003) who fi nd that fi nancial liberalisation reduces 
fi rm-level fi nancing constraints. Column 5 is Column 4, but now with cross-
listing dummy variables included. Like others, I fi nd that Level 2/3 fi rms enjoy 
the largest cross-listing premium (see Doidge et al. 2004, 2009), although 
I document much smaller, and even negative listing premia for both Level 1 
and Rule 144a issues. Also, fi nancial liberalisation remains statistically (and 
economically) signifi cant even, given the inclusion of the cross-listing dummy 
variables. Thus far the results suggest that fi nancial liberalisation and a Level 
2/3 cross-listing in the US impact positively on fi rm value.
In Column 6, I take a fi rst look at how fi nancial deepening impacts on fi rm 
value. Here, I regress Tobin’s q on fi nancial deepening, fi rm-level controls and 
10  To try and alleviate any concerns regarding endogeneity, I re-estimate Equation (1) but 
now with lagged values of the fi nancial liberalisation and deepening variables. The conclusions 
remain the same.
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the cross-listing dummy variables. In Column 7, I add the fi nancial liberalisation 
index to this specifi cation. Taken together, both fi nancial liberalisation and 
fi nancial deepening impact positively on fi rm value. The coeffi cient estimates 
on the fi nancial deepening variable is positive and statistically signifi cant 
in both Columns 6 and 7. Furthermore, adding the fi nancial deepening 
measure to Column 5 (presented in Column 7) does not reduce the statistical 
signifi cance on the coeffi cient of the fi nancial liberalisation index. Finally, 
even given the inclusion of the fi nancial development indicators, Level 2/3 
fi rms still enjoy the largest cross-listing premium. In Columns 8 and 9, I sep-
arate fi nancial deepening into its constituent parts, and estimate how they 
impact individually on fi rm value. In Column 10, I include these variables 
simultaneously, along with the fi nancial liberalisation index, the cross-
listing dummies, and the full collection of fi rm- and industry-level controls. 
Interestingly, the fi nancial deepening components impact very differently 
on fi rm value. Firm value increases in equity market development. In stark 
contrast, bank sector deepening impacts negatively on fi rm value. Second, 
fi nancial liberalisation is no longer statistically signifi cant once I include the 
components of fi nancial development separately. Again a Level 2/3 exchange 
traded ADR impacts positively on fi rm value, even allowing for the fact that 
the fi nancial development measures enter individually. Taken together, these 
results suggest that fi rms only accrue value from equity market development 
and exchange cross-listings in the US. Financial liberalisation is no longer 
signifi cant once bank and equity deepening are included individually.
Next I assess the economic signifi cance of the coeffi cient estimates just pre-
sented. The coeffi cient estimates from Columns 7 and 10 of Table 2 suggest 
that the greatest gains arise from fi nancial deepening, or more precisely, 
equity market deepening. For example, a one standard deviation increase 
in fi nancial liberalisation (of 3.14 which is similar to the range of fi nancial 
liberalisation experienced in Colombia over the sample period) implies an 
increase in Tobin’s q of 0.075, which is about 5.68 per cent of the average 
value of the fi rms in the sample. Going from the highest to the lowest values 
of fi nancial liberalisation (i.e., 0 to 18) implies an increase in Tobin’s q of 
0.43, which is 32.57 per cent of the average fi rm value in the sample. In 
Mexico, where the most widespread liberalisation reforms occurred over the 
sample period, the implied change in value for Mexican fi rms was 0.36, or 
34.95 per cent of the median value of Mexican fi rms.
The gains from fi nancial deepening are greater. A one standard deviation in 
fi nancial deepening (of 0.78 which is almost identical to the range of fi nancial 
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deepening experienced in the Philippines and South Africa over the sample 
period) is associated with a change in Tobin’s q of 0.49, which is 37.12 per 
cent of the average fi rm value. These gains arise from equity market deepening, 
and not bank sector deepening. A one standard deviation increase in equity 
market deepening (of 0.57 which is similar to the range of equity market 
deepening experienced in Taiwan) implies an increase in Tobin’s q of 0.37. In 
contrast, the same one standard deviation change in bank sector deepening (of 
0.29 which is the range of bank sector deepening in the Philippines) implies 
a decrease in value of 0.25, or 18.94 per cent of average fi rm value. Finally, 
the gains from internationalisation are lower. The largest implied change in 
fi rm value arising from a Level 2/3 listing in the US is 0.225, which is less 
than the gains from fi nancial deepening and fi nancial liberalisation, but they 
do compare more favourably with the gains from the latter. In summary, the 
greatest valuation gains arise from fi nancial deepening, or more precisely, 
equity market deepening, then fi nancial liberalisation, and fi nally fi nancial 
internationalisation. Bank sector deepening leads to lower fi rm value.
Finally, I assess the economic signifi cance over the sample period of the 
results just presented in Table 2. I estimate their economic signifi cance, in 
order to gauge the importance of each, both on an absolute basis and relative 
to each other. Mitton and O’Connor (2010) and Doidge et al. (2004, 2009) 
fi nd that investability (a fi rm-level measure of stock market liberalisations) 
and cross-listings in the US are value enhancing, respectively. In this article, 
I try and examine which, namely, fi nancial development (i.e., liberalisation 
and deepening) or fi nancial internationalisations via cross-listings are more 
important. To assess their economic signifi cance, I estimate how changes in 
these country- and fi rm-level factors between 1982 and 2002 may have im-
pacted on fi rm value over this period based on the coeffi cient estimates 
presented in Table 2. The economic signifi cance estimates are calculated as the 
within-country trend in either fi nancial liberalisation or fi nancial deepening 
over time times the coeffi cient estimates on each of the main variables, i.e., 
fi nancial liberalisation, fi nancial deepening, equity and bank deepening. The 
within-country trends for the country-level fi nancial development indicators 
are derived from the following country-fi xed-effects regression: (FDct = α + 
Countryc + Yeart = εct), where FD is either fi nancial liberalisation or fi nancial 
deepening, Countryc are country-fi xed-effects and Yeart are a full-set of year-
fi xed-effects (where 1982 is the reference year). Since the cross-listing dummy 
variables are simple 0/1 dummies, their economic signifi cance is calculated 
as one times the coeffi cient estimate on each of the dummies, respectively. 
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In the bottom panel of Table 2, I outline the estimates of the effects of each 
fi nancial sector reform on fi rm value. Estimates in bold signify that the 
coeffi cient estimates presented in the top panel of Table 2 are statistically 
signifi cant at conventional levels.
The within-country trend in fi nancial liberalisation and fi nancial deepen-
ing over the period from 1982 to 2002 is 7.41 and 1.22, respectively. The 
corresponding trends for equity and bank sector development are 0.833 and 
0.261, respectively. The increase in fi nancial liberalisation (in Columns 1 to 
8 of Table 2) implies an average increase in the value of fi rms ranging from 
0.118 to 0.178. Since the average emerging market fi rm has a Tobin’s q of 
1.32 (calculated over the entire sample period), this implies an increase in 
value ranging from 8.98 to 13.45 per cent. The corresponding increase in 
fi nancial deepening implies an even lager increase in fi rm value ranging from 
0.765 to 0.769, which is just under 60 per cent of the value of the average 
fi rm in the sample. Equity market deepening over the sample period implies 
an average increase of 1.128, compared to an average decrease in value of 
0.304 for bank sector deepening. Similar to others (Doidge et al. 2004, 2009; 
O’Connor 2009b), I fi nd a cross-listing premium for Level 2/3 lists, but 
unlike others, not for Level 1/Rule 144a issues. Furthermore, the coeffi cient 
estimate on the Level 2/3 dummies suggests that these fi rms enjoy a larger 
cross-listing premium relative to the premium documented by Doidge et al. 
(2009). Specifi cally, an exchange-traded Level 2/3 issue leads to a within-
fi rm change in value ranging from 0.126 to 0.225 (compared to Doidge 
et al., 2009, coeffi cient estimates of 0.08 to 0.16). This implies an increase 
in value ranging from 9.54 to 17.05 per cent, respectively.11
In the last column of Table 2, I include all of the variables in a single 
regression and present estimates of their economic signifi cance. Like before, 
only equity market deepening and fi nancial internationalisation via a 
Level 2/3 ADR impact positively on fi rm value. Using Column 10, the 
economic significance of the equity market development (deepening) 
variable is 7.65 times the estimate on the Level 2/3 cross-listing dummy 
(i.e., 1.072/0.141). Finally, on the basis of the coeffi cients estimates pre-
sented in Table 2, a Level 2/3 cross-listing creates more value for fi rms than 
fi nancial liberalisation over the sample period, although the difference is 
not very large. This contrasts with earlier fi ndings, since at the beginning of 
11 Of course, the results are not directly comparable to Doidge et al. (2009) since their study 
combines developed and emerging market fi rms.
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the sample period, many countries had already well advanced their fi nancial 
liberalisation programmes. The results from earlier fi ndings would then 
suggest that over an extended period, which includes the period that predates 
this sample period, fi nancial liberalisation creates more value than fi nancial 
internationalisation for emerging market fi rms.
In summary, the results suggest that the greatest gains from fi nancial sector 
reforms arise from stock market deepening. Typically, fi nancial liberalisation 
delivers more value than fi nancial internationalisation, although over the 
sample period, they both deliver about the same valuation gains.12 Finally, 
bank sector deepening only serves to reduce fi rm value.
3.1 The components of fi nancial liberalisation
The previous section suggests that fi nancial liberalisation enhances fi rm 
value. In Table 3, I disaggregate the fi nancial liberalisation index into its 
constituent parts and estimate how each, in turn, and then collectively, 
impact on fi rm value. In this specifi cation, multicollinearity may be an issue 
since the reforms essentially take place at the same time. In turn, this may 
serve to lower the signifi cance of the individual coeffi cient estimates. Table 3 
contains coeffi cient estimates from 13 separate regressions: in the fi rst seven, 
I regress Tobin’s q on each of the seven component parts of the fi nancial lib-
eralisation index. In Column 8, all variables are included together. Column 
9 contains the coeffi cient estimate on the fi nancial deepening variable, and 
in Column 10, I augment this specifi cation with the individual fi nancial 
liberalisation variables. In Columns 11–13, I include all of the fi nancial 
liberalisation variables with the individual fi nancial deepening measures. For 
the sake of brevity, I will concentrate on outlining the results from Column 8 
and Columns 11–13. Again, estimates of the economic signifi cance over 
12 While I do not include cross-listings in London in this article, the most recent research 
suggests that at best, cross-listing premia in London are of the same magnitude of those experi-
enced by fi rms that list as Level 2/3 ADRs in the US. Bianconi and Tan (2010) fi nd evidence 
to support this, while Doidge et al. (2009) disagree and fi nd that cross-listing in London does 
not manifest into a cross-listing premium for these fi rms. Doidge et al. (2009) do not include 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) traded fi rms in their sample. O’Connor (2009a) does 
and fi nds that AIM listed Irish fi rms enjoy the largest cross-listing premia of all cross-listed Irish 
fi rms, which is inconsistent with the predictions of the bonding hypothesis.
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the sample period of each reform measure are presented in the remaining 
rows of Table 3.13
The coeffi cient estimates from Column 8 suggest that fi rm value increases 
with interest rate reforms, a reduction in entry barriers and with greater 
international capital fl ows. The latter is consistent with Harrison et al. (2004) 
and Forbes (2007) who fi nd that greater capital controls only serves to increase 
fi rm-fi nancial constraints. In the case of Chile, Forbes (2007) fi nds that the 
increase in fi nancial constraints was greatest for small- and mid-size fi rms. 
Furthermore, recent fi ndings of Giannetti and Ongena (2009) suggest that 
foreign bank entry has important positive implications for non-fi nancial 
fi rms, notably small fi rms, but adverse effects for well-connected (i.e., bank 
or government) domestic fi rms.14 Specifi cally, they show that foreign bank 
entry (in emerging markets) is associated with growth in fi rm sales, assets 
and leverage, where the latter benefi t is especially important given the 
underdevelopment of equity markets in these countries (Booth et al. 2001; 
Giannetti 2003).15
In contrast, security market reforms and privatisation of the banking 
sector destroy value. These results also manifest once I control for fi nancial 
deepening (see Column 10), but as before, fi nancial deepening contributes 
much more to fi rm value than any of the individual fi nancial liberalisation 
variables. The results for security market reforms are in contrast with others 
(Henry 2000; Mitton 2006; Mitton and O’Connor 2010) who all associate 
13 Along similar lines, Bebchuk et al. (2009) demonstrate that not all of the governance 
provisions employed in the G-Index of Gompers et al. (2003) impact fi rm value.
14 Laeven (2001) reaches similar conclusions. He fi nds that foreign bank entry facilitates 
greater lending to young fi rms, who are fi nancially constrained since they are not well connected. 
In turn, foreign banks have few connections to local families. Furthermore, foreign bank entry 
also facilitates greater competition in the banking sector, which should benefi t most fi rms. 
Claessens and Laeven (2004) show that competition in the banking sector is greatest in systems 
with greater foreign bank entry.
15 However, there are instances where foreign bank entry is not always benefi cial. For 
example, in the case of foreign bank entry in India, Gormley (2010) fi nds that foreign bank 
entry only serves to increase, rather than reduce information asymmetries, resulting in ‘cream 
skimming’, i.e., banks lend only to a small group of large fi rms (which are likely to be less 
fi nancially constrained than smaller fi rms), since the cost of information retrieval is large. Beck 
et al. (2009) also fi nd evidence of ‘cream skimming/cherry-picking’ in Mexico following foreign 
bank entry. They also show that the mode of entry was via acquisitions of foreign banks as 
opposed to de novo bank entry.
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stock market liberalisation with positive outcomes for fi rms. Furthermore, 
a large literature also shows that privatisation of the banking sector is gener-
ally benefi cial since state ownership of banks is associated with less access to 
credit, reduced fi nancial stability and lower economic growth (Berger et al. 
2004; Ceterolli 2001).16 Finally, I fi nd mixed results when I examine how 
banking supervision affects fi rm value.
Similar to Table 2, the coeffi cient estimate on the fi nancial deepening 
variable in Column 10 implies a within-fi rm appreciation in Tobin’s q in 
the region of 0.77 over the entire sample period. The implied change in 
fi rm value from interest rate reforms, a reduction in entry barriers, enhanced 
bank supervision and greater international capital fl ows are 0.058, 0.170 
and 0.069, respectively. Their effect on fi rm value is much lower, both 
individually and collectively (0.297) than the change implied by fi nancial 
deepening. Interestingly, the change in value implied by a reduction in entry 
barriers is similar to the change derived from listing in the US as a Level 2/3 
exchange-traded depositary receipt (see Table 2 for the relevant fi gures). In 
contrast, while security market reforms and bank privatisation lower fi rm 
value, security market reforms cause much greater falls in fi rm value. The 
economic signifi cance estimates from Table 3 suggest that security market 
reforms over the sample period imply a fall in value of 0.137, compared to a 
fall of just 0.013 for enhanced bank privatisation. Finally, while not reported, 
the control variables are again correctly signed, and statistically signifi cant.
In Columns 11–13, I include the components of fi nancial deepening 
with the individual components of the fi nancial liberalisation index. By and 
large, the coeffi cient estimates and their level of statistical signifi cance are 
maintained once I include the fi nancial deepening variables individually. As 
before, fi rm value increases with a reduction in entry barriers, interest rate 
deregulation and greater international capital fl ows, while value decreases 
in security (equity) market reforms and greater privatisation of the banking 
sector. Consistent with Table 2, equity (bank) sector deepening increases 
(decreases) fi rm value. Finally, security (equity) market reforms and equity 
market development impact differently on fi rm value, while bank privatisation 
and bank sector deepening decrease fi rm value. Collectively, fi nancial 
deepening implies an average increase in Tobin’s q of 0.768 (1.099 for equity 
16 A related literature demonstrates how privately owned banks perform better than state-
owned (Cornett et al. 2010).
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market deepening and –0.378 for bank sector deepening). A reduction in 
entry barriers implies an average change in value of 0.186 over the sample 
period, while the change in value implied from an increase in international 
capital fl ows is lower at 0.058. Compared to Table 2, the change in value 
implied by a reduction in entry barriers is similar to the valuation gains from 
cross-listing on US exchanges.
The results from Table 2 suggest that on the whole, fi nancial liberalisation 
and equity deepening enhance value, while bank sector deepening only serves 
to reduce value. Of course, it remains possible that in the case of the former, 
increased value does not materialise immediately (i.e., at low levels of fi nancial 
liberalisation), and in the case of the latter, enhanced bank deepening is not 
always associated with lower value. To address these possibilities, I estimate 
the following:
 qi,t = α + β1Xi, t + γ1FinLibc,t + γ2FinLib2c,t + γ3FinDeepc,t  
 + γ4FinDeep2c,t + Yeart + Firmi + ei,t , (2)
where I include squared terms of each of the fi nancial development variables 
to account for possible non linear effects of each of the variables on fi rm 
value. The results are outlined in Table 4. In Table 4, I estimate four separate 
regressions; one each using fi nancial liberalisation, fi nancial deepening, 
equity and bank sector deepening. I supplement this analysis by outlining in 
Figure 2, the predicted Tobin’s q against fi nancial liberalisation, fi nancial 
deepening, equity and bank sector deepening, respectively (with all other 
variables held at their respective means). Figure 2 and the coeffi cient esti-
mates from Table 4 paint a much more informative picture of how fi nancial 
development impacts on fi rm value.17
17 In a similar exercise, I partition the original sample and re-estimate Equation (1) depending 
on whether fi nancial liberalisation/deepening is above or below the (country) sample median 
at each point in time. The results are presented in Appendix 1 and are in line with the results 
presented in Table 4. Specifi cally, fi nancial liberalisation only enhances value where fi nancial 
liberalisation is already well advanced (the coeffi cient on the fi nancial liberalisation variable is 
only signifi cantly positive in the above-median sample). In contrast, fi rm value is more sensitive 
to fi nancial/equity deepening at low levels of each, although in the case of both, the greatest 
absolute increase in value is experienced when fi nancial/equity deepening is well-advanced (i.e., 
0.667 versus 0.211 using fi nancial deepening, and 0.426 versus 0.371 using equity deepening). 
Finally, bank sector deepening tends to decrease value, beyond a low initial level of bank sector 
deepening.
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Table 4
Financial Liberalisation, Financial Deepening and Firm Value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial liberalisation –0.050∗
[1.95]
Financial liberalisation squared 0.003∗∗∗
[2.97]
Financial deepening 0.937∗∗∗
[10.51]
Financial deepening squared –0.071∗∗∗
[3.84]
Equity deepening 1.279∗∗∗
[14.40]
Equity deepening squared –0.188∗∗∗
[7.42]
Bank deepening 0.212∗∗∗
[0.91]
Bank deepening squared –0.999∗∗∗
[7.77]
Firm growth 0.777∗∗∗
[9.38]
0.672∗∗∗
[7.69]
0.683∗∗∗
[8.23]
0.604∗∗∗
[7.03]
Firm size –0.121∗∗∗
[6.64]
–0.152∗∗∗
[7.58]
–0.169∗∗∗
[9.05]
–0.090∗∗∗
[4.57]
Global industry q 0.935∗∗∗
[6.19]
0.939∗∗∗
[5.26]
0.909∗∗∗
[5.26]
0.989∗∗∗
[6.07]
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs 16,204 14,142 16,032 14,314
R-squared 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
Source: This data is taken from an updated version of Beck et al. (2000).
Notes: This table reports coeffi cient estimates from within (fi rm fi xed effects) regressions 
with t-statistics calculated using standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity. The 
dependent variable is Tobin’s q. Financial liberalisation is the Abiad et al. (2008) fi nancial 
liberalisation index. Financial deepening is sum of the stock market capitalisation and 
liabilities of the banking sector, as a percentage of GDP. Equity deepening is stock 
market capitalisation to GDP, and Bank deepening is the liabilities of the banking 
sector as a percentage of GDP. Firm growth is measured as the (geometric) average real 
growth in sales over the prior two years. Firm size is measured as the log of annual sales 
in real US$. Global Industry q is calculated as the average q of all global fi rms within 
each industry classifi cation. Also estimated but not reported are a constant and a full 
set of year dummies. Statistical signifi cance is denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ for the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. The reported R-squared is the overall R-squared where 
the fi rm fi xed effects are not included in the calculation of the R-squared. 
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First, initially fi nancial liberalisation destroys value, but beyond a certain 
level of fi nancial liberalisation, fi rm value increases (the coeffi cient estimate 
on the fi nancial liberalisation variable is signifi cantly negative and the squared 
term is signifi cantly positive). Beyond 8.33, fi nancial liberalisation tends to 
increase value.18 In contrast, fi nancial deepening, or more precisely equity 
deepening enhances value, but at a decreasing rate (the coeffi cient estimates 
on the fi nancial deepening and equity deepening variables are signifi cantly 
positive, while the squared terms are statistically positive). Finally, bank 
deepening has the greatest wealth destroying effects at high levels of bank 
sector deepening, but does create value at very low levels of bank sector 
deepening, i.e., less than 0.106.19
3.2 Regression estimates by level of fi nancial deepening
Next I examine how the level of fi nancial deepening impacts on how fi nancial 
liberalisation reforms cause fi rm value. For example, it is plausible that stock 
market reforms, e.g., opening domestic fi rms to foreign ownership is likely 
to be more effective where the stock market is deep and liquid.20 Of course, 
one might argue that when the fi nancial system is fully/well liberalised, 
then stock/credit markets are likely to be well developed. Consequently, one 
might argue that the analysis presented here is no different to the analysis 
presented in Table 4 (and Appendix 1). However, this is not necessarily the 
case. Specifi cally, while above-median fi nancial development is associated 
with a median fi nancial liberalisation value of 14, the minimum value is 1.75 
with a standard deviation of 2.82, which of course suggests that factors other 
than fi nancial liberalisation promotes deeper capital markets.21 Of course, 
this also suggests that fi nancial liberalisation does not always lead to deeper 
fi nancial markets. The results are presented in Table 5.
18 Partially differentiating Equation (2) yields ∂∂
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
q
FinLib
 = γ1 + 2γ2FinLib = –0.05 + 
2(0.003)FinLib = 0 ⇒ FinLib ∼– 8.33.
The function is at a minimum at 8.33 since the second derivative is positive.
19 
∂
∂
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
q
FinLib  
= γ3 + 2γ4BankDeep = 0.212 + 2(–0.999) BankDeep = 0 ⇒ BankDeep
∼– 0.106.
The function is at a maximum at 0.106 since the second derivative is negative.
20 Financial deepening is also likely to proxy for other factors, e.g., the effi ciency of the legal 
system, the strength of shareholder rights and institutional development. In this regard, given 
the opening of domestic stock markets to foreign owners, the benefi ts are likely to be greater 
where country/corporate governance is strong.
21 Refer to Footnote 3.
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In Table 5, I present two sets of estimates: First, I regress Tobin’s q on the 
fi nancial liberalisation index and the cross-listing dummy variables by level 
of fi nancial deepening. In the remaining columns, I replace the fi nancial 
liberalisation index with its components. As expected, fi nancial liberalisation 
tends to increase value when fi nancial depth is strong, and serves to reduce 
value when fi nancial markets are not well developed. Furthermore, the effects 
are economically large, i.e., the implied absolute change in Tobin’s q is 0.765, 
where fi nancial depth is strong, and an absolute depreciation of 0.594 in 
value where fi nancial depth is weak. In addition, the results also show that 
the benefi ts from cross-listing as a Level 2/3 ADR is greater where fi nancial 
deepening is strong when fi nancial markets are deep. This is consistent with 
Hope et al. (2007) who theorise that the net benefi ts to cross-listing are 
greater for these fi rms, since the costs of listing are likely to be considerably 
less for them.
In the remaining columns of Table 5, I undertake the same analysis, but 
now using the individual components of the fi nancial liberalisation index. 
The results for the combined liberalisation index are largely refl ected in the 
coeffi cient estimates on the components of the index. In summary, with the 
exception of the privatisation of the banking sector and international cap-
ital fl ows, the components of the liberalisation refl ect the behaviour of the 
combined index, i.e., value increasing (decreasing) where fi nancial depth 
is strong (weak). The largest gains come from a reduction in entry barriers 
(0.669 or 47 .79 per cent) and the greatest decrease from stock market 
reforms (0.191 or 15.79 per cent). In contrast, privatisation of the banking 
sector always destroys value, while greater capital fl ows always increases value, 
although in both instances, the implied change in Tobin’s q is economically 
small (i.e., 0.029 or 2.07 per cent and 0.023 or 1.90 per cent for bank 
privatisation and 0.033 or 2.36 per cent and 0.025 or 2.07 per cent for 
international capital fl ows).
3.3 Components of Tobin’s q
In the remainder of this article, I concentrate on examining how the 
components of Tobin’s q change in response to enhanced financial 
development, namely, fi nancial liberlisation and deepening, and international 
cross-listings. I do so, since by examining the components of Tobin’s q, it will 
provide a clearer picture of why, for example, fi nancial liberalisation enhances 
fi rm value. On the one hand, liberalisation may enhance value because growth 
in total assets is outstripped by growth in market capitalisation. In fact, this is 
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what Mitton and O’Connor (2010) fi nd in their study, while Gozzi et al. 
(2008) fi nd that asset growth outstrips growth in market capitalisations, 
which ensures that there are no long-term/permanent valuation gains to 
becoming an international fi rm.
In Table 6, I re-estimate Equation (1) where each of the variables is as before 
but now either total assets or market capitalisation is the dependent variable 
as indicated. Both variables are expressed in logs of US$. In all regressions, 
I only include the control for fi rm growth, since including Global industry 
q, and especially fi rm size, would make little sense in these regressions. 
I present six separate regressions for each of the components of Tobin’ q: in 
the fi rst three, I regress each dependent variable on each of the main fi nancial 
development variables, namely, fi nancial liberalisation, fi nancial deepening, 
and the cross-listing dummy variables, respectively. In the remaining columns, 
I present estimates for the components of fi nancial deepening. The results 
suggest the following: First, fi nancial deepening and international cross-
listings are associated with large-scale corporate expansion. The latter has 
previously been documented by Gozzi et al. (2008). Interestingly, fi nancial 
liberalisation is not associated with corporate expansion. On the contrary, 
I fi nd that fi nancial liberalisation is associated with lower fi rm size. These 
results hold in all four regressions. Changes in market capitalisation also 
follow a similar pattern: Financial deepening and international cross-
listings (bar Rule 144a issues) lead to permanent increases in market 
capitalisations, which is consistent with Gozzi et al. (2008). In contrast, 
fi nancial liberalisations are not associated with a permanent increase in 
market capitalisation. Taken together, the results suggest that the valuation 
gains from fi nancial liberalisations result solely from reduced corporate 
size. In contrast, the valuation gains from both fi nancial deepening and 
fi nancial internationalisation, via depositary receipt programmes, result 
from increases in both corporate size and market capitalisations, where the 
increase in market capitalisations outweighs the increase in corporate size. In 
the bottom rows of Table 6, I provide estimates of the economic signifi cance 
of each. Interestingly, non-exchange traded depositary receipt issues (i.e., 
Level 1 and Rule 144a issues) lead to the greatest increases in fi rm size, 
but not surprisingly, the smallest increases in market capitalisations. Both 
fi nancial deepening and Level 2/3 depositary receipts lead to the largest 
market capitalisation appreciations.22
22 In Appendix 2, I examine how the components of fi nancial liberalisation impacts on 
total assets and market capitalisation. In a nutshell, Table 3 suggested that value increases in 
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I supplement this analysis by re-estimating Equation (2), where again each 
of the variables is as before but now either total assets or market capitalisation 
is the dependent variable as indicated. Both variables are expressed in logs 
of US$. As before, I only include the control for fi rm growth, since includ-
ing Global Industry q, and especially fi rm size, would make little sense in 
these regressions. In Figures 3 and 4, the predicted total assets and market 
capitalisations against fi nancial liberalisation, fi nancial deepening, equity 
and bank sector deepening, respectively (with all other variables held at 
their respective means).23 The fi gures are in line with the results presented in 
Table 6, but do in themselves reveal some interesting fi ndings. As suggested 
in Table 6, fi nancial liberalisation is associated with increased market cap-
italisation, but lower fi rm size, resulting in greater fi rm value. Financial 
deepening is associated with increases in fi rm size and market capitalisations, 
and the trends for fi nancial deepening as a whole, are similar to those 
outlined for equity market deepening. Finally, while bank sector deepening 
is associated with lower values of market capitalisations, and growth in assets, 
these trends do not manifest immediately. In fact, low/initial levels of bank 
sector deepening are associated with increases in market capitalisations and 
reductions in total assets. Beyond certain points, these trends are reversed 
and tend to dominate. The net result is that bank sector deepening tends 
to reduce fi rm value.
The fall in fi rm size associated with fi nancial liberalisation is consistent with 
the fi ndings of Abiad et al. (2004) that fi nancial liberalisation is associated 
with a more effi cient allocation of capital, which ultimately benefi ts small 
deregulation of interest rates, a reduction in entry barriers, bank supervision and international 
capital fl ows, while security market reforms and greater banking supervision only served to 
reduce value. Appendix 2 provides greater clarity as to why these results manifest. What is 
really interesting from Appendix 2 is how fi rm value appreciations can come about differently, 
for example, from both interest rate deregulation and a reduction in entry barriers. In the case 
of the former, interest rate deregulation causes an increase in fi rm size (total assets) and market 
capitalisation, with presumably the latter growing quicker, resulting in an appreciation in 
value. A reduction in entry barriers increases fi rm value, not through an appreciation in market 
capitalisations, but solely from a reduction in fi rm size. The increase in fi rm value arising from 
greater international capital fl ows arises similarly to the valuation gains that arise from interest 
rate deregulation. Finally, both security market reforms and bank privatisation reduce value 
primarily since growth rate of assets presumably outstrips the growth in market capitalisations, 
although in the case of the former, market capitalisation actually decreases with reform.
23 The coeffi cient estimates from these regressions are unreported but are available from 
me upon request.
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fi rms. Since smaller, younger fi rms tend to be fi nancially constrained, in part 
because of poor fi nancial development, fi nancial development/liberalisation is 
likely to reduce their fi nancial constraints, faciliate their growth and increase 
their size (Christoffersen et al. 2006; Laeven 2003). In contrast, larger fi rms 
are likely to be less fi nancially constrained and are less likely to benefi t from 
fi nancial liberalisation. In fact, given poor fi nancial development, large fi rms 
are able to reaffi rm their competitive advantage over small fi rms within the 
same industry. However, given fi rm dynamics and competitive (industry) 
interactions, this is likely to be reversed; small fi rms grow, and the growth of 
large fi rms decreases (Costantini 2008). Since our sample of fi rms is largely 
made up of large fi rms, given the coverage of the Worldscope database, we 
observe this latter effect, i.e., the effect of fi nancial liberalisation on the size 
of large fi rms.
4. Concluding Remarks
A large literature exists which suggests that fi nancial development matters. 
While its detractors will point to the fact that fi nancial liberalisation appears 
to increase the likelihood of banking crises, and make output more volatile in 
the short-term, it is generally well-accepted that fi nancial liberalisation delivers 
long-term gains, both at the fi rm-level and collectively at the macroeconomic 
level. At the fi rm level, fi nancial development is associated with, among other 
things, a relaxation of fi nancing constraints, which ultimately promotes 
growth and investment. In this article, I seek to examine whether these gains 
manifest into higher value for these fi rms. I am partly motivated by recent 
work, which suggests that a certain aspect of fi nancial liberalisation, namely, 
stock market liberalisations, enhances fi rm value (Mitton and O’Connor 
2010). Here, I examine the valuation effects of other components of fi nancial 
liberalisation reforms, and the valuation effects of fi nancial liberalisation 
collectively. At least to the best of my knowledge, this has yet to be fully 
explored. The article also seeks to examine how both aspects of fi nancial 
development, namely, liberalisation and deepening impact on fi rm value. 
Recent work suggests that they can have very differing effects on fi rm-level 
outcomes (Abiad et al. 2004). Finally, and in a similar vein, I seek to examine 
how the valuation gains from domestic fi nancial development compare to the 
valuation gains that arise from internationalisations, for example, through 
international cross-listings in the US. The former is generally associated with 
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what is commonly referred to as a cross-listing premium (Doidge et al. 2004, 
2009). I compare how the valuation gains from listing abroad compare to 
the gains from domestic fi nancial development. Schmukler and Vesperoni 
(2006) do likewise in their study of corporate debt maturity.
I fi nd that fi nancial development matters for fi rm value. Firm value 
increases in both fi nancial liberalisation and fi nancial deepening, although 
the latter provides the greatest valuation gains. For example, over the 
entire sample period, the implied change in Tobin’ q attributed to fi nancial 
deepening is about fi ve times as large as the change implied by fi nancial 
liberalisation. Both impact positively on fi rm value, but fi nancial deepening 
has a greater impact. Of course, since fi nancial deepening is in part caused 
by fi nancial liberalisation, the valuation premium assigned to deepening over 
liberalisation is likely to be overstated. Second, on closer inspection, I fi nd that 
the valuation gains from fi nancial deepening arise solely from equity market 
deepening. In contrast, bank sector deepening reduces fi rm value. Finally, like 
many others, I document a cross-listing premium for Level 2/3 ADRs. The 
implied gains from fi nancial liberalisation are typically greater than the gains 
from fi nancial internationalisation, but they are similar in magnitude over 
the period examined. Of course, these results then suggest that fi rms would 
benefi t more, at least in terms of value, not from an international cross-listing, 
but from measures that promote greater fi nancial deepening at home.
Thomas O’Connor, Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, National 
University of Ireland Maynooth, Maynooth Co. Kildare, Ireland. E-mail: thomas.g. 
oconnor@nuim.ie
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